Ben Polak教授任职于耶鲁大学管理学院经济系。他在剑桥大学Trinity College获得学士学位，在西北大学获得硕士学位，在哈佛大学获得博士学位。他是微观经济理论和经济史方面的专家。他的论文在Economic Letters、Journal of Economic Theory、Journal of Economic History、Journal of Legal Studies、 Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics、Econometrica等学术期刊多次发表。他最近的研究是“广义功利主义和海萨尼的公正观察员定理”和“平均分散的偏好”。
Ben Polak is a Professor of Economics and Management in the Department of Economics and the School of Management at Yale University. He received his B.A. from Trinity College, Cambridge University, his M.A. from Northwestern University, and his Ph.D. from Harvard University. A specialist in microeconomic theory and economic history, he has published in Economic Letters, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Economic History, Journal of Legal Studies, Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, and Econometrica. His current projects include "Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi's Impartial Observer Theorem" and "Mean-Dispersion Preferences."
1. Introduction: five first lessons
2. Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
3. Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
4. Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
5. Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
6. Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
7. Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line
8. Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
9. Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
10. Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
11. Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
12. Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
13. Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
14. Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages
15. Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
16. Backward induction: reputation and duels
17. Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
18. Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
19. Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
20. Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
21. Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
22. Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
23. Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
24. Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse
